Stablecoin Scanner

Open ERC-20 and Permit2 allowances one address has granted on one chain, one row per spender and token with the raw value, unlimited/oversized/old flags, spender_class and a band (critical|high|low|expired|none): unlimited to a flagged or unknown spender is the main drain vector, a known service spender (DEX router, Permit2) is normal, an expired Permit2 sub-allowance reads 'expired'. Use it when the question is what a wallet has approved and who could pull its stablecoins. Not for a risk tier — the band is informational and never moves get_address_risk. Not for issuer freezes: get_address_compliance. Not for taint: get_address_exposure. address is the allowance owner (the granter), never the spender. Heavy read: under load it answers busy or timeout — retry with backoff. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. A heuristic band over decoded on-chain Approval facts, not an AML or legal determination.

Issuer freeze/seize facts for one address on one chain, plus the OFAC SDN flag: freeze[] (one row per freeze-capable stablecoin, status frozen|seized|clear|unknown, with frozen_usd6 = the balance locked now where it was read), not_freezable[] (stablecoins whose issuer cannot freeze on this chain, e.g. the Binance-Peg wrappers on BNB Chain — enforcement is off-chain), frozen_elsewhere[] (the same address bytes under a standing freeze on another indexed chain; EVM and Tron share them, Solana never) and freeze_proposals[] (issuer multisig proposals naming the address, USDT on Ethereum and Tron: executed ones; pending ones only where the operator publishes them in full — elsewhere a pending proposal's address is shown once it executes). Use it when the question is whether an issuer or OFAC acted on this address, or how much is frozen. Not for a risk tier: get_address_risk. Not for taint distance: get_address_exposure. Not for when the OFAC list was refreshed: get_sanctions_status. Decoded on-chain issuer acts with provenance, no heuristics. 'unknown' means no act names the address and that pair's freeze history is not fully backfilled yet — absence of evidence is not 'not frozen'; an empty frozen_elsewhere[] or freeze_proposals[] means none in what is indexed, not clean everywhere. Each chain is its own issuer act: pass chain to ask Ethereum or Tron about the same bytes, chains_with_data says where. Heavy read: under load it answers busy or timeout — retry with backoff. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. Not an identity, AML or legal determination.

Taint exposure of one address on one chain: a bounded backward walk over the value graph to the nearest OFAC-sanctioned or hack/drainer/mixer root, answered as a class (sanctioned|direct|indirect|negligible|unknown|none), the nearest hop and a value-proportional haircut fraction. Use it to explain how closely an address is tied to a sanctioned or hack root and by how much value. Not for one go/no-go tier — get_address_risk already includes this walk. Not for the counterparties themselves or a chosen depth, token or window: get_wallet_graph_walk. Not for issuer freezes: get_address_compliance. 'unknown' means the walk did not complete — OFAC list unloaded, time_budget, frontier_cap, Solana coverage pending or partial, short history, or no hack/drainer/mixer label loaded for this chain — never a false 'none'; incomplete_reasons names which (time_budget may complete at a quieter moment, frontier_cap repeats). Depth is fixed at 3 hops and the walk never crosses chains: ask again with chain set for each network in chains_with_data. A verdict is reused for up to 60 s (10 s after a time_budget cut). Heavy read: under load it answers busy or timeout — retry with backoff. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. A heuristic signal, not an AML or legal determination.

Unified risk tier for one address on one chain — unknown|none|low|medium|high|severe — from decoded facts (OFAC listing, issuer freeze/seize on this chain, exposure to a sanctioned or hack root) and attributed labels with provenance (labels alone cap at medium; a lone-source accusation adds no tier). Use it for one go/no-go read before accepting or sending funds. Not for freeze proposals, frozen balances or a freeze on another chain (frozen_elsewhere): get_address_compliance. Not for taint hops or the haircut: get_address_exposure. Not for open allowances: get_address_approvals. 'unknown' means the check did not finish, never 'checked clean'; evidence and incomplete_reasons name the cause (e.g. time_budget: the exposure walk was cut, a quieter moment may complete it). The freeze input is this chain's per-token status alone: frozen/seized argues for high (not a row with own_token_contract: the issuer's act on its own token contract), and an 'unknown' status or a pair whose freeze history is not backfilled turns a would-be 'none' into 'unknown' — so a Solana tier, where every freeze pair is unknown, is never 'none'. The exposure walk behind the tier is fixed at 3 hops; pick depth and window with get_wallet_graph_walk. A verdict is reused for up to 60 s (10 s after a time_budget cut). Heavy read: under load it answers busy or timeout — retry with backoff. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. Not an identity, AML or legal determination.

Recent stablecoin transfers on one chain, newest first, filterable by payer and/or recipient, cursor-paginated. Use it for the latest transfers of an address or of the whole chain, with a tx_hash to cite. Not for who an address settles with over time: get_wallet_graph_walk. Not for how fresh the feed is: get_sync_status. Not for any verdict about an address: get_address_risk. Answer: items[], each row tx_hash, log_index, block_number, block_time (RFC 3339), payer, recipient, amount {amount (minor units, string), decimals, token (symbol)}, token (the contract address), finality, and usd_amount where priced. The chain is the one asked for — rows do not repeat it. payer and recipient narrow together; omit both for the chain-wide feed; pass next_cursor back unchanged as cursor for older rows, and a page without it is the last. Heavy read: under load it answers busy or timeout — retry with backoff. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. Plain on-chain Transfer facts, no scoring.

OFAC SDN list coverage as this scanner holds it: evm_count, solana_count, tron_count and total addresses loaded (the free public 0xB10C list of US-Government public-domain data), updated_at of the last refresh (null until the first ingest) and the source. Use it to date the sanctions input behind a verdict, or to tell a clear OFAC flag from an unloaded list. Not for whether one address is listed: get_address_compliance (the flag) or get_address_risk (the tier). Not for indexer freshness: get_sync_status. No parameters; one answer covers every chain. Light read, never waits for a slot. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. Verify against the official SDN list before acting on it; not legal advice.

Indexer freshness for one chain: freshness_seconds (the age of the newest indexed transfer; null when it could not be read for this answer), the indexer's head and finalized blocks, its safe block and its lag in blocks (lag_blocks = head_block - last_indexed_block). Use it before trusting how recent an address answer is, or to tell an empty feed from a stalled indexer. Not for how fresh the OFAC list is: get_sanctions_status. Every address verdict already carries freshness_seconds, so call this only for the block numbers or for a chain you have not asked about yet. On Solana (chain -1) safe_block is the finalized slot, and lag_blocks is near 0 by construction and never negative, so it is not a freshness signal there: read freshness_seconds. On the EVM chains and Tron a negative lag_blocks means the node's head went back. chain is the only parameter; omit it for Base. Light read, never waits for a slot. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools.

Bounded walk over the indexed settlement graph of one stablecoin from one wallet on one chain: payer<->recipient hops with value-weighted scores, entity-aware node keys, a stop at known services and sanctioned-node markers. Use it to explain who an address settles with and through which hops. Not for a verdict: get_address_risk. Not for the taint class or haircut: get_address_exposure. Not for a flat list of transfers with tx hashes: get_recent_transactions. token is required and must be a stablecoin enabled on that chain (a refusal names them); hops=0 with stop_on_sanctioned=true is the cheapest check of the subject itself; subjects over the degree gate (~50k edge-rows) return hop 1 only with frontier_truncated=true. Heavy read: under load it answers busy or timeout — retry with backoff, a narrower window or a lower frontier_cap. No auth; 1200 requests/min shared by all tools. An explainability primitive, not a detector verdict, identity/control assertion, AML decision or legal advice. window_from present means the answer was built from that date, the edge-grain horizon, not from the start of the requested window; the default window all, 90d and 1y included (/v1/methodology edge_grain_horizon). When window_from is present, read the graph as covering that span only — do not treat the absence of a counterparty, a path or a sanctioned node as evidence about anything before that date. volume on nodes is the token's raw minor units (divide by 10^decimals); volume_usd6 is the same amount in USD with 6 decimals at peg 1. On Solana (chain -1) the answer carries coverage_status for the subject address only, never for its counterparties: pending — its history is still being filled, so an empty or small answer is not final; partial — filled to a documented bound. The walk shows a finished fill after the next Solana rollup pass (about 10 minutes), and never shows history older than window_from. This read never starts a fill, so pending can also mean none was asked for yet: one compliance read of the address asks for it. A Solana answer without coverage_status could not read it in time — treat it as pending. On Solana (chain -1) the edge grain of 2026-07-20..2026-09-14 is incomplete: those days hold part of their transfers or none, because their raw rows were offloaded before a fix reached production on 2026-09-17; they are not restored, and answers do not mark them (decision of 2026-09-17). Solana's grain is never trimmed, so there the horizon that window_from reports is not where retained data ends: once window_from is later than 2026-09-14 the answer holds none of those days. An answer that reaches them — window_from on or before 2026-09-14, or no window_from over a window that includes them — counts them as floors: at least this much, never the whole, and a counterparty, path or sanctioned node missing from those days is not evidence that there was none.